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South Africa is a major developing country known for its wide income inequality inherited 
from the apartheid years. This paper provides a theoretical examination of the impact of 
financial development and credit constraints on earnings inequality in the country between 
1923 and 2008. The time-span is particularly interesting, as it includes three distinct political 
regimes: colonialism, apartheid and democracy. We draw on the microeconomic models of 
credit-rationing to understand the relationship between interest rates and inequality and 
reconcile these findings with the macroeconomic literature on the role of financial market 
development. Although the correlations for the entire sample were significantly low, the 
within-period correlations revealed interesting trends. From a theoretical point of view, lower 
interest rates during the colonial period could be said to have contributed to lowering credit 
constraints on middle-class Afrikaner landowners, contributing to a decline in inequality. 
During the apartheid era, higher demand for investment put pressure on interest rates; 
declines in inequality during the period were attributed to a great extent to government 
interventions. Thereafter, upon the implementation of the democratic regime, despite the 
noteworthy developments in the country‟s financial markets, the increase in interest rates 
constituted a considerable barrier to capital accumulation and wealth remained highly 
concentrated at the top.  
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1. Motivation and Overview 
 
South Africa is a developing country that has experienced positive growth since the 
implementation of democracy in 1994. However, poverty and high income inequality remain 
a concern. While the formal economy has prospered, becoming more technologically 
advanced, competitive and providing viable opportunities for skilled workers, the informal 
sector populated mostly by the unskilled and unemployable poor has not been as prosperous. 
 
Financial and credit market imperfections and their effects on income inequality have been a 
prolific topic of debate in the growth literature. Despite these developments, there has been 
little work on the links between financial intermediation and credit rationing and their impact 
on income inequality, especially in the context of South Africa. Related empirical evidence 
establishes that credit markets play a role in speeding up job creation and poverty alleviation, 
thereby reducing inequality. The importance of financial markets in such instances is twofold. 
Firstly, well developed financial markets benefit the poor by allowing them to invest in 
education and other profitable ventures and secondly, it gives the poor some form of 
insurance in times of macroeconomic volatility (Bittencourt, 2006). 
 
However, it is not always the case that financial development leads to reductions in income 
inequality. Asymmetrically distributed information in credit markets drives a wedge between 
the interests of borrowers and lenders. Investment projects with the same return are then 
faced with different costs of capital depending on the borrowers‟ initial wealth. Lenders will 
offer credit only to those who can offer some security in the event of default. The poor lack 
collateral assets (be it in form of immovable property or valuable movables) and are thus 
denied access to credit. Even when the poor are allowed to borrow, their incentive to exert 
effort and make their enterprise viable declines the more they have to pay back. Therefore, 
the lower the entrepreneur‟s wealth and the higher the interest rate, the higher the incentive to 
shirk. Lenders take this into account when allocating their funds and choose to not lend to the 
poor. Credit rationing implies that the gains from better financial intermediation are more 
likely to accrue to those at the top, while the poor lag behind. 
 
The objective of this paper is twofold: firstly, it provides a theoretical overview of the 











hand and the microeconomic models of credit-rationing on the other. Secondly, it relates the 
literature to the South African context using the interest rate mechanism.  
 
Existing studies on the role of credit market imperfections, emphasise two relatively 
opposing views, one in which the poor are net borrowers and another in which the poor are 
net lenders. As discussed by Piketty (1997), in an economy in which the poor are net 
borrowers, higher interest rates are associated with a higher proportion of credit constrained 
individuals, lower capital accumulation and higher inequality. Therefore, it is possible that an 
economy reaches a long-run steady-state with persistent inequality. Aghion and Bolton 
(1997) extend the analysis and describe the mechanism of trickle-down growth when the poor 
are net borrowers. Sufficiently high levels of capital accumulation by the rich allow more 
funds to become available to the poor who are then able to invest and escape poverty. In a 
relatively similar work, Matsuyama (2000) looks at the role of incomplete credit markets in 
which the rich are allowed to borrow, while the poor are net lenders. Inequality persists in the 
long run because the scarcity of rich individuals implies lower demand for credit and lower 
interest rates, which hurt the poor. When there are a large proportion of rich individuals in the 
economy, higher demand for loanable funds pushes up the interest rate to the benefit of the 
poor and inequality decreases. 
 
In order to investigate which of these views is consistent with the South African evidence we 
look at the correlations between the interest rate and inequality from 1913 to 2008. This time 
span is particularly interesting because it covers three distinct periods in the South African 
history: colonialism, Apartheid and democracy. For the colonial and apartheid periods (1913-
1993), we use a measure of inequality recently published by Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), 
calculated as the income shares of the top 1 percent wealth holders, and estimated using 
income tax data. Given the data limitations, for the post-apartheid period (1994-2008) we use 
the World Bank Development Indicators to determine the top 10 percent income shares. The 
interest rate data is obtained from Firer and McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002), 
updated to 2008. For the colonial era, the evidence is in line with the predictions of Piketty 
(1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997), where lower interest rates permit the diversification of 
economic activity and as growth trickles down to the poor inequality falls. During the 
apartheid period, the implementation of measures to reduce the income gap between the 
English capitalists and the Afrikaner landowners led to the formation of a new class of 











proposed by Matsuyama (2000) in which a larger number of rich individuals, increases 
demand for credit, pushes up the interest rate and reduces inequality. For the democratic 
period, a somewhat surprising finding was the increase in inequality despite government 
policy to deal with the issue. The trend was explained in terms of the Piketty (1997) 
framework, where higher interest rates deter investment and capital accumulation, thus 
contributing to the persistence of income inequality. Furthermore, the concentration of wealth 
at the top among very few individuals limits the supply of credit, raising interest rates, 
lowering capital accumulation and increasing inequality. 
 
The remainder of this paper has the following structure: the next section reviews the existing 
literature. Section 3 provides the historical background of the South African financial sector. 
Section 4 looks at the empirical evidence and finally Section 5 concludes the paper, 
summarises the main findings, discusses the limitations of the results and provides some of 
the policy implications of increasing the access to financial and credit markets. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
In this section we will draw on the existing literature to reconcile the macroeconomic models 
of financial development and the micro-economic models of credit rationing. More recently, 
interest in financial markets and institutions has developed as economists have realised their 
relevance for and impact on g owth and output fluctuations. These in turn affect the 
distribution of wealth through their influence on the allocation of credit and investment 
opportunities. 
 
2.1 Establishing the link between financial development, credit rationing and inequality 
 
The growth and development literature provides a substantial body of evidence that predicts a 
positive impact of financial development on inequality and poverty. If financial markets are 
complete, investment opportunities with the same return face the same market price of 
capital, regardless of the borrower‟s initial wealth.  Claessens and Perotti (2005) show that by 













Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) complement to the findings of Claessens and Perotti 
(2005) and provide a body of evidence which shows that beyond providing equal 
opportunities to the rich and the poor, financial development reduces the income distribution 
gap by expanding the pool of investment opportunities in an economy. A well-developed 
financial system improves the allocation of resources, fosters growth and demand for labour 
and affects wages thereby promoting equity. Extending their argument, the authors explain 
that wealth constraints on the poor are exacerbated if financial markets are weak, since moral 
hazard and adverse selection have a stronger impact on credit allocation. The authors also 
predict that if entrants are faced with fixed costs when starting a project as well as when 
joining financial intermediaries, at the initial stages of development inequality will increase. 
As the economy progresses, more people join financial intermediaries, more resources are 
made available, incomes rise and development in the sector helps bridge the gap between rich 
and poor. In this scenario, financial development ensures that wealth trickles down to the 
poor and incomes converge. 
 
In an empirical study, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2004) use a regression-based model 
to estimate the relationship between finance and changes in income distribution and poverty. 
The paper determines that financial market frictions may be specially binding on the poor 
who lack collateral, as such, any relaxation on credit constraints will have a 
disproportionately positive effect on the poor, is strongly associated with poverty alleviation 
and will improve efficiency and resource allocation. 
 
However, it is not always the case that a more dynamic financial environment benefits the 
poor. Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) recognise that financial development could have a 
negative impact on inequality if it leads to increases in the returns to skills and 
entrepreneurial ability. In this case, it is possible that individuals with high ability are 
compensated without any significant impact on the incomes of the poor, widening the income 
gap.  
 
Beyond the credit market constraints, the political system and macroeconomic stability are 
important determinants of the relationship between finance and inequality. Li, Squire and Zou 
(1998) draw on the political economy literature to explain to that  the extent to which the rich 
can lobby for policies – either through bribes or through direct political control – in a way 











Then, developments in the financial markets will be captured by the rich, perpetuating 
inequality. Macroeconomic stability also plays an important role in ensuring that the poor 
benefit from financial development, as postulated by Clarke, Xu and Zou (2003) monetary 
instability has a disproportionately negative impact on the poor and middle-class when 
compared to the rich, since the latter have better access to financial intermediation which 
protects them in periods of high inflation. When considering the political economy 
arguments, they conclude that diversity exacerbates inequalities as different political 
structures lobby for redistribution policies that benefit their own ethnic group. Furthermore, 
legal origins appear significantly related to financial development, since some legal systems 
have a higher regard for property rights and are more adaptable to exogenous changes. 
 
A further topic, widely debated in the financial development literature is the role of 
technological diffusion in reducing cross-country inequalities. Theories predict that countries 
growth rates should converge as those lagging behind take advantage of their backwardness 
adopt and adapt the technologies developed elsewhere and catch-up. However, cross-country 
differences in growth rates exist and persist. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2004) 
present a cross country study in which they show that financial constraints are what prevents 
poor countries from taking full advantage of technological transfer and what makes their 
growth rates diverge from the world technological frontier. Convergence is clubby in the 
sense that countries that have reached a certain level of development will converge to the 
same growth rate, while the others fall behind. Financial development could work as a 
mechanism that facilitates technological diffusion and ensure that laggard countries catch up. 
 
2.2 Models of occupational choice and inequality 
 
In attempting to understand the relationship between occupational choices and inequality, 
Pellicer et al. (2011) identify three economic mechanisms of inequality persistence relevant 
to our analysis: the credit market, the market for skills and the labour market. The focus of 
this paper is on the credit market; however, the relevance of the other realms of interaction 
between economic agents is also briefly considered. Financial markets are relevant in this 
context in the sense that, as explained before, they expand the pool of available opportunities, 
enhance the poor‟s ability to invest in human capital, acquire skills and influence the choices 
between becoming an entrepreneur and selecting an alternative occupation. Thus, financial 











growth. In perfectly competitive financial markets, the decision to invest – including that 
relating to human capital accumulation – depends solely on the expected return. However, 
when such markets are less than perfect, borrowing constraints and non-convex investment 
opportunities imply that cross-dynasty inequalities can persist. 
 
2.2.1 The credit market - Financial development, imperfect information and credit rationing 
 
The bulk of the above-mentioned evidence establishes that financial development can have a 
significant impact in reducing inequality. However, the relationship is not as straight forward 
as it sounds - the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection implies that financial 
markets are imperfectly accessed by the poor. On one hand, if markets are perfectly 
competitive, investment decisions can be modelled as being independent of income or wealth. 
The relevant determinants of investment then become the expected returns and the market 
price of capital. Entrepreneurs with good investment opportunities are able to borrow and 
finance their investments. People with the same returns on their investments will invest 
exactly the same amounts; in periods when interest rates are high agents will prefer to lend 
and when they are low, agents will prefer to become borrowers. On the other hand, as 
discussed by the World Development Report (2006), credit markets are far from the ideal 
described above. When lenders have imperfect information about borrowers and agency costs 
are high, there will be a gap between borrowing and lending rates. Borrowers who are easier 
to monitor are likely to enjoy better rates. If markets are less than perfect and borrowers can 
wilfully default on their loans, lenders will prefer to provide loans to borrowers who can 
provide collateral assets, i.e. the rich. Those unable to provide collateral will have no access 
to credit. Efficient allocation of loanable funds becomes problematic when there is 
underinvestment by the poor with good growth opportunities. 
General equilibrium models present an important theoretical argument for the relationship 
between financial development and inequality. Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and 
Matsuyama (2000) develop models of occupational choice by analysing the borrowing and 
lending mechanism in capital markets with imperfect information. In their study, lenders 
know that the more an agent needs to borrow and the higher the interest rate, the higher is the 
incentive to shirk. Lenders will choose not to lend, or at least limit lending to the poor. Only 
agents with wealth above a certain level will find it profitable or be allowed to become 












Piketty (1997) presents a model in which, because there are fixed costs associated with 
becoming an entrepreneur and diminishing returns to investment, the rich are net lenders 
while the poor are net borrowers. Lower interest rates benefit the poor as borrowers. Higher 
interest rates on the other hand, induce a higher steady state fraction of credit-constrained 
individuals and lower long-run capital accumulation. There are two possible steady states in 
this framework, one with low interest rates and no credit rationing and one where interest 
rates are high, it takes longer for credit-constrained agents to rebuild their capital and there is 
separation between the rich and the poor. Poverty traps are thus more likely when interest 
rates are high and inequality can persist even in the long-run. On aggregate, the model 
predicts that countries with higher interest rates and low wealth mobility will have lower 
investment levels, be more unequal and grow more slowly than countries with lower interest 
rates. 
 
Aghion and Bolton (1997) complement the argument presented by Piketty (1997) and show 
the mechanism through which the accumulation of wealth by the rich trickles down to the 
poor. Capital accumulation by the rich implies that more funds are made available to the poor 
for investment purposes and lending terms are shifted in favour of borrowers. The middle-
class agents are able to catch up with the rich and borrow and invest in their own individual 
projects to escape poverty. 
  
Matsuyama (2000), on the other hand, assumes that investment opportunities are profitable 
and face increasing returns, implying that it is optimal to borrow and invest as much as 
possible (Pellicer et al., 2011). Imperfect information in capital markets implies that lenders 
choose to assign loans only to agents who can provide collateral assets, i.e. the rich. The rich 
then become borrowers and the poor, lenders. Because of the gap between borrowing and 
lending rates, the poor accumulate less wealth than the rich and lag behind. Therefore in this 
model inequality is endogenous and the rich accumulate wealth partly because of the poor. 
Convergence in income distribution would occur in this scenario if demand for capital by the 
rich pulled up the interest rate to the benefit of the poor as lenders. They would thus be able 
to catch up with the rich in a trickle-down mechanism that is clearly different from the one 
discussed by Aghion and Bolton (1997). Therefore there are two possible long-run outcomes, 
one in which there is convergence in income distribution to a unique steady state and another 
where the economy remains polarised. In this model, contrary to the models above, low 











Brückner, Gerling and Grüner (2010) attempt to bridge the gap between these general 
equilibrium models and empirical evidence using a regression-based model. Their work 
evaluates the relationship between real interest rates and income inequality in the US, UK 
and Sweden from the early 1920s to 1992. The results show a positive relationship between 
inequality and the interest rate; more equality being associated with lower interest rates, as 
hypothesised by Piketty (1997). The model shows a significant cointegration relationship 
between the interest rate and wealth inequality for the US and Sweden, but not for the UK.  
Also, they find no evidence of a statistically significant relationship between wealth 
inequality and growth, which the authors interpret as refuting the trickle-down mechanism 
presented by Aghion and Bolton (1997). When using a Vector Error Correction Model 
(VECM), inequality and the interest rate remain significantly related, even after additional 
controls (such as trade openness, human capital formation and alternative measures of the 
interest rate) are introduced. The authors take their analysis one step further and apply it to a 
panel of 16 OECD countries over the period 1960-2008 and are able to supplement their 
evidence (at the conventional significant levels) of a positive relationship between wealth 
inequality and the interest rate.  
 
2.2.2 Capital market imperfections, the market or skills and the labour market 
 
In analysing the mechanisms for inequality persistence in the market for skills, the literature 
provides us with models of occupational choice in which the faith of an economy, 
convergence of income across agents or persistence of inequality, are somewhat dependent 
on initial conditions. Becker and Tomes (1986) analyse parents‟ decisions to invest in their 
children‟s education and its impact on intergenerational mobility, what the authors call “the 
rise and fall of families” when individuals differ in their abilities. They work on the 
assumption that parents‟ utility increases with consumption and investments in their 
children‟s education, thus consumption and human capital investment are indivisible and 
increased investment in education implies lower consumption. If capital markets work 
perfectly, high-ability individuals are able to borrow against their ability and invest in 
schooling irrespective of their parents‟ wealth. On the condition that ability endowments are 
mean-reverting, initial differences in wealth across generations do not persist. However, if 
capital markets are imperfect, poor families will find it difficult to finance the investment in 
their children‟s education since loans to supplement their limited resources are difficult to 











comparatively lower ability will receive more schooling than the higher ability children from 
poor families; that is, the wealth effect dominates the ability effect. Another relevant finding, 
especially in the context of developing economies, is the negative relationship between 
household size and investment in human capital: the larger the household, the lower the 
investment per child. Jacoby and Skoufias (2000) extend this study and show that when 
financial markets are imperfect and households suffer an unexpected income shock they will 
tend to reduce their investment in their children‟s human capital or use their labour in low-
wage jobs at the expense of higher-return education. This happens because of borrowing 
constraints which do not allow poor households access to insurance against income shocks. 
 
Galor and Zeira (1993) also explore the relationship between the distribution of wealth and 
investments in human capital in the context of imperfect capital markets. However, contrary 
to Becker and Tomes (1986), they assume that individuals are identical in their abilities or 
potential skills and differ only in terms of inherited wealth. Imperfect information and high 
monitoring costs drive a wedge between borrowing and lending interest rates. Poor 
individuals face borrowing constraints and invest less in education than the wealthy. In the 
long-run, the level of investment in human capital determines the distribution of income. The 
future of each dynasty is then determined by initial wealth; rich dynasties invest in education, 
work in the skilled sector, accumulate wealth and leave large bequests. Poor dynasties, on the 
other hand, inherit less, do not invest in education, and leave less to future generations. It is 
the initial wealth distribution that determines educational choices and the long-run 
equilibrium in the economy. Poverty traps arise when there is credit rationing, poor agents 
cannot invest in education, do not accumulate enough wealth and remain poor. In this model, 
some dynasties never become wealthy. 
The study by Mookherjee and Ray (2003) also looks at the relationship between occupational 
choice and inequality. Their model assumes that skilled and unskilled labour are not perfect 
substitutes and, given the costs of acquiring skills and capital market imperfections, it is 
possible that the economy reaches a unique steady state in which individuals are locked in a 
specific occupation, with a particular wage and level of consumption. Thus, there is 
persistence of inequality in steady state. This result contrasts with others discussed above, 













The interactions between rich and poor individuals in the context of the labour market as 
presented by Banerjee and Newman (1993) show that, given capital market imperfections and 
borrowing constraints, the poor will prefer occupations that do not require high levels of 
investment. Wage contracts then become substitutes for financial contracts and the wage is 
determined in such a way that the labour market clears. Economic development is thus 
determined by the initial distribution of wealth – where the rich are few, the economy will be 
characterised by high inequality and poverty. That is, when there are a large number of poor 
individuals in an economy of relatively poor people, the economy will converge to a steady 
state where wage employment and large-scale production prevail, while an economy with 
few very poor people is more likely to converge to a steady state dominated by self-
employment in small-scale production.  
 
3. Financial sector development in South Africa 
 
This section will document the development of the financial sector in South Africa from the 
early 1900s to 2008. By reviewing the history we expect to gain a better understanding of the 
extent to which financial intermediary development has contributed to broadening the access 
of these services. We do so by looking at the role of monetary policy, the Stock Market and 
the banking system. 
 
3.1 Historical background of the financial sector and the economy 
 
From the 1880s mining played a major role in the in the South African economic system, and 
as speculation in the sector increased, banks expanded their operations. During the 1910s 
growing mining houses and imperial banks, under the control of London banks, were at the 
centre of the economy (Bond, 2003). 
 
From a historical point of view, the late 1880s and early 1900s were a period of significant 
income inequality and important developments in the financial sector. The English elite 
controlled most of the capital in the country, while the Afrikaners were mainly landowners 
and the black population, labourers. The substantial start-up costs to mining contributed to 
this separation of wealth between the English and Afrikaner population. Fedderke (2010) 











raising the required financing (mostly from abroad) and obtaining the appropriate level of 
expertise. This implied that only certain groups, mostly foreign, participated in the activity. 
Compounded with this was the considerable risk associated with investing in a country where 
mining firms had a difficult relationship with the government. 
 
Towards the end of the First World War, the weakening control of the City of London over 
the banking sector on South Africa became evident. This happened as a result of the 
increasing pressures caused by the war, the uncertainties on the gold standard as base for the 
currency, the devaluation of the pound and the rise of New York as a competitor. By 1918 the 
gap between the value of gold and the declining South African currency led to massive gold 
smuggling. To prevent further losses, gold was formally delinked from currency in 1920. In 
1925, when conditions improved, South Africa returned to the gold standard (Bond, 2003; 
Rossouw and Padayachee, 2008). 
 
In 1920, to deal with the financial uncertainty, the Union of South Africa authorities decided 
to create a local Reserve Bank to act as a grantor for banks and the South African currency. 
Disputes over the banking regulation meant the Reserve Bank had to be placed under the 
direct control and ownership of bankers (the mining elites) rather than being state owned. The 
developments in the world economy and the changes in the domestic banking system helped 
strengthen the power of the English elite while agricultural production fell behind. In rural 
areas, farmers accumulated large amounts of debt. This, compounded with the low 
agricultural productivity led to a state of dependence for landowners (Bond, 2003). There was 
a need to transform the economy, and policies implemented at the time allowed the expansion 
of credit concessions to landowners and the growth of manufacturing and commercial 
agriculture. 
 The 1929 crash brought back pessimism to the economy and banks began to cut back on 
lending. Agricultural profits declined as foreign demand fell and land became overpriced. 
Foreign investment decreased, as did exports excluding gold. During the 1930s many 
countries could not afford to back their currency in gold. In 1932 Britain (still at the centre of 
international finance) abandoned the gold standard and many countries followed. Without a 
way to root the value of currencies, international trade stagnated and protectionist currency 
blocks developed. South Africa was still part of the British sterling area. As the world‟s 
leading gold producer, the country could remain on the gold standard. However, because the 











end of 1932, the overwhelming pressures on the economy led to the abandonment of the gold 
standard and the devaluation of the currency (Bond, 2003). All in all, the wealth holdings of 
both farmers and mining capitalists suffered as a result of the volatility in the world economy. 
  
Early in 1933, banks began to restructure their interest rates (going from 6 percent for loans 
and 3.5 percent for savers, to 5 and 0.5 percent respectively). Where demand for loans 
existed, enormous financial profits could be made from the interest rate spread. Gold and 
agricultural exports picked up after the currency devaluation and the rest of the economy 
followed. From 1933 to the 1940s, as South Africa became relatively isolated from the 
international arena, the economy grew significantly (with an average GDP increase of 8% per 
annum), more evenly across sectors and with larger relative wage increases for blacks than in 
any other time in the twentieth century (Bond, 2003). The proportion of wealth of those at the 
top during the 1930s and early 1940s declined, bringing more equality in incomes. 
  
While the country prospered, tensions between the English-speaking financial elites and 
Afrikaner farmers remained. By the mid-1940s, the benefits of the financial elites outweighed 
those of the Afrikaners, especially because of the former‟s influence over gold mining (and 
the 1944 Breton Woods agreement regulating international finance through semi-gold 
standard) and the expansion of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 1946. The political arena 
went through substantial restructuring in 1948, when the National Party came into power. It 
focused on institutionalising existing racial practices through apartheid and also overcoming 
the ethnic imbalances in the financial system. This facilitated the emergence of a new class of 
Afrikaner financial, industrial and commercial capitalist. Financial capital diversified into 
commerce and industry, the Afrikaner financial capital became less dependent on agriculture 
and the cooperation between Afrikaner and the non-Afrikaner elites helped reduce struggles 
between the two classes (Bond, 2003). 
 
The pace of innovation in the South African financial sector began to accelerate in the late 
1950s. Before this period, banking was mainly controlled by English-owned commercial 
banks. Thereafter, banking began to diversify its operations into insurance, and investment in 
manufacturing and commercial enterprise (Ndako, 2010). The first merchant bank (Union 
Acceptances) and the first discount house (Discount House of South Africa) emerged, and the 












Also in the 1950s, production strengthened and higher capital intensity in mining, agriculture 
and the production of middle-class goods all contributed to economic growth. The financial 
sector also deepened its contribution to growth as demand for more diversified sources of 
financing increased. These developments allowed the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) to 
broaden its base and sound monetary policy became an evident priority (Jones, 1992; Bond, 
2003). 
 
Financial sector growth was interrupted in the 1960s by the political uncertainty surrounding 
the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth and the implementation of 
apartheid. Only in the 1980s, at a time of sanctions, inflation, the debt crisis, deregulation and 
increased competition did the financial sector begin to recover. This was as a result of the 
collapse in the growth of the economy combined with the mobilisation of funds by the 
financial sector (Jones, 1992). 
 
From 1970s to the 1980s, growth rates fell, the country experienced losses in agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining and exports declined. The economy moved from a position of low 
growth to one of no growth. The main causes of such a negative trend were the decline in the 
price of gold, high and volatile inflation and the excesses in government spending (on 
ammunitions manufacturing, the anti-terrorist campaigns in Namibia and the Angolan war of 
1975-1978) and the sanctions imposed on the country‟s government. The subsidising of 
corrupt and inefficient government practices which went unpunished and high taxation which 
crippled private enterprise were also at the root of the problem. By 1990, economic 
imperatives brought a halt to these disruptive policies. The ending of economic growth was 
further accompanied by the continued rapid growth of the population, which had the effect of 
converting the very modest rates of real growth into an absolute decline expressed in real 
terms. The serious decline in savings followed from the decline in per capita disposable 
incomes. Investment prospects under such a scenario were worrying. Given high inflation, 
there was little incentive to save and private investment fell. In turn, the relative importance 
of the government‟s share of gross domestic fixed investment increased (Jones and Inggs, 
1994; 2003). 
 
President De Klerk‟s speech of 2 February 1990 signalled the beginning of major changes in 
the South African political and economic arena. Initially, there was a great uncertainty 











it came into power. While the integration of South Africa into global markets represented 
new opportunities for domestic businesses, it also made the economy more vulnerable to 
external shocks. Real GDP declined from 1990 to 1992, mainly because of the uncertainties 
surrounding the new government. It improved notably after the 1994 democratic elections. 
However, growth was substantially lower in the 1990s than in previous decades (even the 
1980s). Inflation was high at the beginning of the decade, but declined from 1993. The 
balance of payments position also improved significantly after the elections. Although 
inequality remained high, important changes took place: the gap between different racial 
groups became smaller while the distribution among the Black population became more 
unequal (Mohr, 2003). Despite expectations that the changes in the political system would 
result in a reduction in inequality in South Africa, inequality increased from 1994.  Moreover, 
even though the country‟s financial sector grew substantially; there were no signs of any 
substantial benefits accruing to the poor. 
 
According to Jones and Inggs (2003), private enterprise was the main driver of growth in the 
1980s and 1990s. The financial sector was the largest contributor to growth, with its 
contribution increasing from 14.4 percent in 1990 to 20.3 percent in 2000. The authors 
establish that private enterprise was the driving force behind the expansion of the banking 
sector as new financial institutions were formed in the country. 
  
3.2 Monetary policy 
 
Both fiscal and monetary policy prior to the 1980s were characterised by extensive use of 
direct controls such as import controls, credit ceilings and the imposition of a maximum 
interest rates (Jones, 1992). As explained by Addelson (1992), monetary policy in this period 
had no clearly defined framework. Central bank independence was not regarded as a priority 
and the execution of monetary policy was the responsibility of both fiscal authorities and the 
Reserve Bank (Wessels 2004). In the 1960s and 1970s, inflation was high, and the 
developments in the financial markets where suppressed by the direct controls imposed over 
banks and other financial institutions. (Gidlow, 1999) 
 
During the 1980s, monetary policy was strongly influenced by monetarism. It emphasised 
monetary targeting, whereby the level of interest rates and the external value of the currency 











part of the authorities should be avoided (Jones, 1992). The banks also began to change their 
mechanisms of controlling money supply, there was a phasing out of the liquid asset 
requirement on commercial banks and  a more indirect channel was used, namely the Bank 
rate (Hodge, 2001). Although initially the authorities intended to implement Central Bank 
independence, such intentions never fully materialised, monetary policy remained strongly 
influenced by political matter and inflation remained high and volatile (Wessels, 2004). 
 
Although great attempts were made to stabilise the interest rate and inflation between the 
1970s and the 1980s, monetary policy failed to achieve these objectives. Dr. C.L. Stals 
became governor of the Reserve Bank after Dr. M. H. de Kock‟s death in 1989. Monetary 
policy became tighter, less erratic and took a clear stance against inflation as well as the 
ending of negative real interest rates. This was also a time when Central Bank independence 
was accentuated and the developments contributed to containing inflationary expectation in 
the country (Wessels, 2004). 
 
The 1990s imposed a challenge on the implementation of monetary policy. There were fears 
that the newly elected ANC government would embark on a populist spending programme to 
achieve the objectives of the party‟s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). 
The fears never materialised and the RDP objectives where constrained by the 
implementation of the conservative macroeconomic policy framework of GEAR (Growth 
Employment and Redistribution), announced in 1996. This helped ease the pressure on 
monetary policy to contain the rates of growth on monetary aggregates (Hodge, 2001). 
 
The 1994 elections came, the political instability dissipated and South Africa became an 
integrant member of the global economy. Net capital inflows increased, as did the country‟s 
foreign exchange reserves. Given the positive response of financial markets, authorities 
began the systematic removal of exchange controls. The financial rand system was ended in 
March 1995 (Hodge, 2001). 
 
Schoombee (2003) explains that the reintegration of South Africa into the global financial 
system and the increased volatility in financial markets in the late 1990s demanded flexibility 
in short-term interest rates and in the monetary authorities‟ ability to respond promptly to 
changes in market conditions. This was the motivation behind the implementation of the 











was that it became more aligned with what was generally the policy stance in industrialised 
countries. The manner in which monetary control was conducted in South Africa made an 
important contribution to the substantial decrease in inflation in the 1990s. 
 
During Dr Stals‟ term the Reserve Bank chose to avoid setting an official inflation target, 
announcing that the objective was to bring inflation in line with the rates of inflation of the 
country‟s major trading partners, between 1 and 5 percent (Schoombee, 2003). In February 
2000, Trevor Manuel, the then Minister of Finance, announced the adoption of inflation 
targeting as monetary policy framework for South Africa. The target was specified in terms 
of changes in consumer price inflation (CPIX), and it was set for achievement in 2002 as it 
took 18 to 24 months for the country‟s interest rates to influence inflation. The specification 
of a range rather than a specific point was determined as being more appropriate for South 
Africa, as it would improve the probability of achievement by the Reserve Bank and thus 
guarantee the credibility of the system. In 2001, the range was specified as being between 3 
and 6 percent. Although actual inflation has at times deviated from the targets, the latter have 
remained unchanged (Rossouw and Padayachee, 2008). 
 
3.3 Stock Market Development – The Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
 
At the centre of the market level of the financial sector is the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
It was founded in 1887, initially to fund the development of mining companies in the wake of 
the discovery of gold (Akinboade and Makina, 2006). 
 
The main functions of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) are threefold: to channel 
savings into investments, to provide liquidity for investments, and to provide some form of 
evaluation of securities and of management of companies whose shares are quoted on the 
Exchange (Jones, 1992). 
 
Before the 1960s, the Exchange was mainly a market for highly volatile mining shares, 
somewhat removed from the country‟s leading financial institutions. However, rapid 
economic growth, and the exchange rate control, drew the attention of business. The stock 
market had become very profitable, as the return on equity investment was considerably 











income. Between the 1960s and early 1980s, the substantial rise in dividends and returns 
provided a strong incentive for investing (Jones, 1992). 
 
From the 1980s, as pressures for the end of the apartheid regime intensified, foreign 
multinationals faced increasing pressures to withdraw their investments in the country. The 
rationale for the disinvestment campaigns was that it would cripple the government‟s ability 
to sustain the apartheid regime. This panic of capital flight gave a boost to the Exchange and 
provided bargains for local capitalists. Government legislation as well as disinvestment by 
large foreign-owned firms worked to reinforce the trend towards capital concentration. 
(Jones, 1992) 
 
A number of initiatives were introduced in the late 1990s to improve the efficient functioning 
of the Exchange. In 1995 the JSE was restructured and liberalised; trading was then opened to 
non-South Africans, allowing brokers to buy and sell stock for their own account (Yartey, 
2008). Since then, continuous innovation has allowed trading to become more efficient, more 
transparent and in line with international standards, increasing investor confidence and 
raising the profile of the JSE among the international investor community. Some of the 
measures implemented include the replacement of the „open cry‟ system (where deals were 
conducted on telephones) by the automated trading system; the introduction of the Shares 
Transactions Totally Electronic (STRATE); the separation of the stock exchange and the 
bond market; the merger of the JSE with the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX); the 
replacement of trading and information with that of the London Stock Exchange (LSE); and 
the adoption of the free-floating indexing system to improve the comparability of the South 
African Stocks worldwide (JSE; Ndako, 2010; Yartey, 2008). 
 
3.4 The South African Banking Sector 
 
Ever since the late 1800s, concentration has been a dominant feature of the South African 
banking environment. In 1910, the sector was controlled by four foreign banking 
corporations: Standard Bank, the Bank of Africa, the African Banking Corporation and the 
Netherlands Bank. The Volkskas Group was formed in 1934 and represented the introduction 












In 1942 was the promulgation of the first comprehensive Banks Act. It classified banks 
institutions according to functions (commercial banks, deposit-taking institutions, people‟s 
banks and loan banks) and allowed monetary authorities a greater control over money supply. 
From then on, amendments to the Act gave the Reserve Bank more influence over the 
competitive environment in which banks operated. Although these measures did restrict 
credit concessions (thus curbing increases in money supply), they had the adverse effect of 
increasing concentration and reducing competition between banks, this way threatening 
efficiency. 
 
Commercial banks began to introduce measures to protect their dominant position. In the 
mid-1960s, they entered into an agreement with the smaller banks to collude on and extended 
maximum/minimum fees, tariffs, rates and commissions charged. This agreement was the 
Register of Cooperation among commercial banks (Rocco). The agreement guaranteed order 
and discipline among commercial banks that and reduced risk for smaller participants, it also 
induced them to implement more advanced equipment and technology, and improve service 
delivery. However, Rocco also limited competition and the ability of banks to innovate 
outside the agreement (Verhoef, 2009). 
 
At a time of political unrest, as the international opposition to the apartheid regime was 
gaining ground, the banking sector was becoming less and less competitive. This was reason 
for concern, given that the sector was dominated by foreign institutions. Under the 
recommendation of the Franszen Commission, in 1973 a ceiling of 50 percent foreign 
ownership was declared. Thereafter, Standard Bank and Barclays were listed on the JSE and 
the controlling shareholding of these groups was passed to South African hands (Verhoef, 
2009). 
 
The 1970s were a time of evident contradictions in the regulatory framework for banks. 
While the monetary authorities attempted to move away from direct control measures in the 
sector, they continued to restrict international capital flows from participation in the South 
African banking sector. Although the banking legislation did follow the international trends 













In the late 1970s, high liquidity and inflation, growing international pressure against 
apartheid and the depreciation of the South African currency led to substantial changes to the 
monetary environment. Competition among banks was once again encouraged through the 
removal of barriers to foreign capital. The measures led to increased competition, put 
pressure on interest margins and led to rapid product innovation. But the banking sector 
continued to be highly concentrated, mainly because of the high capital requirements 
imposed on banks. Foreign banks were still not allowed to conduct business in the country. 
This restriction was lifted only in 1990 (Verhoef, 2009). 
 
In the 1980s, increased competition motivated computerisation and further diversification of 
banking services. Concentration remained high. Only in the 1990s did it begin to decrease 
marginally and a more competitive environment arose (Verhoef, 2009). 
 
The 1990s marked the first decade of the increased competition among the four big banks – 
First Rand Group, ABSA (Amalgamate Bank of South Africa), Standard Bank Investment 
Corporation, the Nedcor Group – and new entrants. Nevertheless the role of foreign banks 
remained limited (Verhoef, 2009). 
 
The participation of South African banks in foreign market increased after 1997, when 
permission was granted in that year. The ability of domestic banks to extend operations 
overseas worked to prove their management capabilities, the strength of their capital base and 
the confidence of both national and foreign clients. Globalisation of bank operations was as 
much a function of the size and level of experience and expertise of the banks as of the 
soundness of domestic central bank regulation (Verhoef, 2009). 
  
Between 2001 and 2002, the banking sector in South Africa became more concentrated, this 












Figure 1: Income shares of the top 1 percent wealth holders. Source: Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010). 
 
rich banks. The banking sector remains more competitive than it was in the 1990s. However, 
the increase in competition, especially between 1994 and 2001 did not lead to improvements 
in efficiency (Verhoef, 2009). 
 
The penetration of foreign banks was reconfigured in 2005 when ABSA became a subsidiary 
of Barclays Bank. The return of Barclays after its withdrawal in 1987 was interpreted as 
confirmation of the attractiveness of investing in South Africa (Verhoef, 2009). 
 
4. Data and Measurement 
 
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the relationship between the interest rate and 
inequality, using annual data for South Africa between 1913 and 2008. The inequality data 
used for the colonial and apartheid periods, and the one used for the post-apartheid 
democratic regime differ due to data availability. 
 
4.1 Income inequality, 1913-1993 
 
This study uses wealth inequality data, estimated using income shares of the top 1 percent 
wealth holders covering, with gaps, the period from 1913 to 1993. The annual time series was 






























































































































Estimates of top income shares were acquired using income tax returns data. The challenge of 
using the inequality time series lies in the fact that there are missing observations. The 
relevance of the period for which we have missing data should not be understated, however, 
according to the authors; the unavailability of statistics was confirmed by the Treasury of 
South Africa as well as by the South African Revenue Services
1
. Despite the likely 
underestimation of the level of income inequality at the top, the data is still a valuable source 
of understanding of the degree of inequality in the country. 
 
For the period 1914 to 1953, estimates for the top income shares are obtained excluding 
dividend income. For the period 1953 to 1993, dividend income is included. Inspection of the 
trends suggests very little difference between the two series. 
 
Figure1 plots the evolution of our inequality indicator for the period 1914 to 1993. The figure 
shows that there was a general decline in inequality. However, the distribution did not remain 
steady. Inequality was particularly high during the First and Second World Wars. In 1914, the 
top 1 percent wealth holders‟ share of the country‟s income was around 20 percent, meaning 
that this group had on average 20 times their proportionate share. The share fell to about 10 
percent in the early 1990s. 
 
Capital income inequality at the beginning of the sample was high, with most of the country‟s 
wealth concentrated at the top and among the white population. In the early 1900s, the high 
dependence of the economy on the extraction of diamonds and gold implied that only a 
selected few benefited from the economy‟s development and growth. The high levels of 
concentration, fixed costs and expertise required posed as strong barriers to new entrants. It is 
not surprising that top incomes responded notably to changes to gold production and prices. 
The impact of such changes declined around the 1950s and 1960s as the country diversified 
into manufacturing. 
 
The tensions surrounding the apartheid government and the adoption of sanctions by the 
international community are translated in the data. Top incomes did not rise between the 
1980s and the early 1990s. 
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Figure 2: Income shares of the top 1 percent income earners, 1993-2008. Source: World Bank 
Development Indicators (2010). 
 
4.2 Income Inequality, 1993-2008 
 
In order to obtain results that are more accurate for the post-apartheid period, a second dataset 
was used. Inequality is defined as the percentage of the country‟s total income held by the top 
10 percent income earners and was obtained using the World Bank Development Indicators 
(2010), calculated at 2008 constant prices. Figure 2 displays South Africa as a very unequal 
country, with the highest 10 percent earners holding more than 50 percent of the country‟s 
income. 
 
Figure 2 above shows the trends in income inequality. Although the Apartheid regime came 
to an end in 1994, it left behind substantial challenges for the new democratic government - 
poverty and inequality being the most pervasive. More than a decade after Apartheid, studies 
have shown that inequality has either increased or remained stagnant, especially because of 
the increase in inequality among the black population. Although the country has seen 
satisfactory levels of economic growth, it has not been pro-poor. 
 
Granting that the democratic government‟s policies - from Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) to the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), to the 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) - over the years 























































































been made in these fields. Most of the employment created in the country has been in the 
skilled labour sector, while unskilled labour demand has either fallen or remained stagnant. 
The contribution of investment to these goals has also been disappointing (Bhorat, Van der 
Westhuizen and Jacobs, 2009; Fedderke, 2010; Hoogeveen and Özler, 2005). 
 
Moreover, as explained by Bhorat, Van der Westhuizen and Jacobs (2009), capital income 
inequality in South Africa is high. However, because capital income is a very small 
contributor to total income in South Africa, this source of inequality has not been a major 
topic of research and studies have focused rather on wage inequality. 
 
When exposing the argument that growth has not been pro-poor in South Africa, consensus 
exists that the growth trajectory of the country has been mainly beneficial to the formal 
economy, characterised by high concentration and high barriers to entry. Additionally, the 
growing sectors in the country are mostly capital intensive and/or demanding of skilled 
labour. In general, the informal sector has not been able to take advantage of the country‟s 
economic growth. Some of the identified entry barriers to the formal economy have been the 
lack of collateral assets by poor agents, which restricts access to financial intermediation, low 
skills and concentration of the formal economy in urban areas when the poor are mostly 















Figure 3: Real interest rate, 1913-2008. Source: Firer and McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton 
(2002). 
 
4.3 Interest rates, 1913-2008 
 
In order to analyse the hypothesis put forth by Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997), and 
Matsuyama (2000), we will firstly look at the patterns of interest rates between 1900 and 
2008. Thereafter we will attempt to establish whether higher inequality increases the 
equilibrium risk-free rate or whether it decreases it. 
 
The real interest rate   is computed using the Fisher equation 
                     
     
where it denotes the nominal risk-free rate and Πt the expected inflation rate. Assuming that 
individuals are perfectly rational, the expected and the actual inflation rate will be equal  
(Π
e
t = Πt). The interest rate data and inflation data are obtained from Firer and McLeod 
(1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002). The Treasury bill (T-bill) returns (measured based on 
Negotiable Certificate of Deposits and T-bills data) are used as a proxy nominal risk-free 
interest rate and inflation is measured using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). 
 
The time series graph in Figure 3 shows that during World War 1 and 2 and for the period 



















































































































 Table 1: Correlations between Inequality and Interest Rates 




0.0150 0.22787 -0.2148 0.3546 
Source: Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), World Bank Development Indicators (2010) Firer and 
McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002). 
 
rates reached a record low of -17.3 percent, then dipped again, reaching -8.7 percent in 1942 




4.4 Interest rates and inequality 
 
As shown in Table 1, there is only a weak correlation between inequality and the interest 
rates between 1923 and 1993 – when colonialism and apartheid are considered 
simultaneously; the data shows that the financial system contributed very little to changes in 
inequality. The result could be attributed to the extensive macroeconomic and policy changes 
that occurred from one period to the next which introduce a great amount of variability in the 
model, masking important underlying trends. On one hand, during the colonial years capital 
ownership was concentrated among the English population, while the National Party focused 
on overcoming the ethnic imbalances in the financial system by uplifting the position of the 
Afrikaner population. The National Party was responsible for extensive credit concessions 
once it came into power, allowing farmers to invest in the financial sector. The changes in 
monetary policy, as documented in Section 3 also had an influence on interest rates. It is 
reasonable to expect that the changes from one period to the next could disguise important 
trends in the data. Thus, taking the South African political context into account, we divide the 
sample into three periods: colonialism (1923-1947), apartheid (1948-1993) and democracy 
(1994-2008). 
 
In a similar analysis Brückner, Gerling and Grüner (2010) use a VECM to establish whether 
there is a positive relationship between the real interest rate and income inequality as 
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 Because the changes during the First World War contaminate the results to a great extent, we will exclude the 











hypothesised by Piketty (1997). When applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test to 
the South African data to investigate the stationarity of our series we find that the real interest 
rate data is stationary
3
. Hence, there is no cointegration relationship between the interest rate 
and inequality, that is, there is no long-run association between the variables. This being the 
case, we use a simple correlation analysis to draw our conclusions. 
 
While for the apartheid years inequality and the interest rate display a negative relationship, 
we see inequality increasing with interest rate for both the colonial period and after the 
implementation of democracy. In the next section we will attempt to understand the within 
period correlations over the various political regimes in the context of the credit-rationing 
models developed by Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Matsuyama (2000). 
 
5. Theoretical Understanding of the Relationship Between Inequality 
and Financial and Credit Markets 
 
To further explore the relationship between inequality, credit rationing and financial 
development we will draw on the within-period correlation results obtained in Table 1 as well 
as the theoretical models of Piketty (1997), Aghion and Bolton (1997) and Matsuyama 
(2000). We will complement this analysis by drawing on the historical background of the 
South African economy and financial sector development. The goal is to use the existing data 
and literature to establish a link between the macro models of financial development and the 
microeconomic models of credit rationing to the evolution of inequality in South African. 
  
5.1 Inequality and interest rate, 1923-1948 
 
Between 1923 and 1947, the South African data appears to give some evidence relating to the 
theoretical predictions of Piketty (1997), who predicts that inequality should be increasing 
with interest rates. Moreover, the evidence also supplements the findings of Aghion and 
Bolton (1997), whereby the benefits of capital accumulation should trickle down to the poor 
and inequality should fall for high enough levels of accumulation by the rich. 
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 Using the ADF test, the t-statistic on the real interest rate (1923-2008)  is -3.913 with critical values -3.531 











Piketty (1997) and Aghion and Bolton (1997) build models in which the entrepreneurs incur a 
fixed cost when investing in a profitable venture with diminishing returns. What this implies 
is that, beyond a certain point, investors will have exhausted all available profitable 
opportunities and will lend to the poor. Thus, in their formulations the poor are net borrowers. 
 
In the framework outlined by Piketty (1997) inequality can persist even in the long run. 
Higher interest rates are associated with higher steady state fraction of credit constrained 
individuals and lower long-run capital accumulation. This happens because credit constraints 
are so tight that it takes a long time for credit-constrained individuals to rebuild their capital. 
In a scenario where there is no credit rationing, borrowers do not shirk and supply high effort. 
Equilibrium interest rate and allocation of capital are independent of initial wealth. Therefore, 
optimum level of investment is determined where the interest rate and the marginal product 
of capital are equal. In this model, the rich lend to the poor. With no credit rationing all 
dynasties converge to the average wealth level, inequality uncorrelated with the interest rate 
and there is no poverty trap. 
 
Introducing credit rationing to the model, changes the conclusions. Assume effort supply is 
not observable and it is costly to monitor borrowers, then the interest rate will be set high 
enough to induce high effort on the part of borrowers and to take into consideration the risk 
of the project failing, in which case no repayment is made to the lender. The higher the initial 
investment, the higher the repayable amount and the lower the incentive to exert effort. 
Lenders then set the interest rates high enough to induce high effort. 
 
In this scenario, credit rationing will occur when interest rates are high. With low interest 
rates credit rationing disappears because the net returns become sufficiently high to give 
proper incentives to agents with no collateral. Multiple steady states could then arise in the 
long-run. If the interest rate is sufficiently low so that no credit constraint appears, then 
inequality decreases since credit is better allocated. When long-run steady interest rates are 
high, both upward and downward mobility are less likely. A high initial wealth requirement 
implies that credit-constrained individuals as net borrowers do not accumulate enough 
wealth. The wealthy, on the other hand, have high interest rate incomes even if their 












Aghion and Bolton (1997) provides an understanding as to the mechanisms that permit the 
evolution of inequality to a unique steady state. Growth trickles down to the poor because 
given high interest rates the rich continue to invest, while the poor prefer to become lenders 
and inequality increases. As the rich accumulate more wealth, the pool of profitable 
opportunities is exhausted, additional funds become available for the poor to invest and 
lending terms are shifted in favour of borrowers. The middle-class agents are able to catch up 
with the rich and the poor are also able to borrow and invest in their own individual projects. 
 
At least theoretically, the data seems to fit well with the models proposed by Piketty (1997) 
and Aghion and Bolton (1997). During the 1920s and 1930s the more profitable investment 
opportunities were associated with gold mining. Those investors able to enter the sector made 
large profits; this was the mineral on which the world economy depended. Profits were 
determined by supply, those who adopted best practices and the most advanced technology, 
were more efficient and earned greater returns. However, only a selected few were able to 
enter the mining sector. The substantial fixed costs and expertise required in extracting the 
mineral and the uncertainties of the gold-pegged exchange rate system (which introduced a 
serious element of volatility to the sector) and the shocks in foreign demand (especially for 
the domestic agricultural products) served as a deterrent to investment for the middle-class 
agents such as the Afrikaner landowners. The constraints were even more severe to the black 
population for whom racial and other restrictions, such as land ownership, implied that they 
owned no collateral assets and therefore could not enter the credit market and invest. 
 
One would then expect that, during the colonial period, the entrepreneurial power to be 
concentrated among the English population, while the Afrikaner middle-class and the black 
population lagged behind. Taking a closer look at Figure 4, we see no major changes on top 
income inequality between the 1920s and early 1930s. 
 
History reminds us that in 1932 the country abandoned the gold standard; the benefits to the 
economy were almost immediately felt. In 1933 banks began to restructure interest rates 
following the exchange rate shocks and the changes in monetary policy of the late 1920s. As 
in the framework discussed above, this gave the poor, as net borrowers, the chance to invest 














Figure 4: Inequality and interest rate, 1923-1948. Source: Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), Firer and 
McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002). 
 
Moreover, as the mining sector‟s earnings grew, the economy diversified into other relatively 
more accessible opportunities, such as manufacturing. State intervention was also a major 
contributor to the diversification of the economy, as shown by Fedderke and Simkins (2009). 
The state intervened both indirectly, by implementing import tariffs to protect local 
production as well as directly by implementing governmental bodies to help capitalise local 
businesses which faced substantial barriers in raising capital themselves. Both diversification 
and state intervention could have contributed to the downward trend in wealth inequality we 
see from the 1930s onwards. 
 
Although there was a trend decline in inequality, as is evident in Figure 4, the literature 
emphasises two probable deterrents to further reductions on the income gap, one being the 
racial divide and the other, the level of progress in the financial market. Racial segregation 
prevented the black population from sharing the benefits of economic prosperity, thus 
captured by the English capitalists and Afrikaner middle-class. Changes to labour policy and 
attempts to increase human capital benefited the white population, leaving the black 
population to become labourers or self-employed in low return activities (Fedderke and 
Simkins, 2009). The clubby financial sector, developed to serve the interest of big mining 
houses, English elites and the Afrikaner landowners worked less than efficiently in allocating 
savings to investors. Also in the 1920s the local Reserve Bank was created and placed under 


































































































































Figure 5: Inequality and interest rate, 1948-1993. Sources: Alvaredo and Atkinson (2010), Firer and 
McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002). 
 
English elites, while undermining income equality in the country. Thus, although low interest 
rates would benefit those at the bottom, or at least the middle-class, one would not expect the 
gains to be very significant. 
 
Despite the progress made two decades earlier, in the 1940s money supply and interest rates 
began to increase, as did inequality.  The gold mining boom and the expansion of the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange, controlled mainly by the English elite could be at the centre 
of these developments. 
 
5.2. Inequality and interest rate, 1948-1993 
 
The negative association between inequality and the interest rate between 1948 and 1993 is 
evidenced in Table 1 and (to a lesser extent) in Figure 5. We make use of the general 
equilibrium framework developed by Matsuyama (2000) to examine this relationship. The 
author presents a scenario in which inequality decreases with interest rates. Investment 
opportunities require an initial capital investment and face increasing returns. Therefore, it is 
optimal to borrow and invest as much as possible. Given that the poor lack collateral assets, 
the rich end up as net borrowers and the poor as net lenders (Pellicer et al, 2011). In the 
model, there are three types of agents, the rich acting as entrepreneurs, and borrowing to 




















































































































wealth and invest and the poor as lenders. Inequality can persist in the long-run when the 
poor, acting as lenders face a lower interest rate than the rich‟s return to investment. Another 
possible steady state occurs when the income gap disappears as the rich increased demand for 
credit pushes up the interest rates, allowing the poor to catch up. 
 
In the model borrowing is limited; individuals wishing to invest at a scale greater than their 
inherited wealth will have to enter the competitive credit market and borrow at an interest 
rate determined to equate the supply and demand for loanable funds. Borrowing is limited 
because it is costly for lenders to monitor borrowers‟ effort. As the scale of investment 
increases, the borrower‟s end-of-period wealth (his/her private return) declines. Moreover, 
since investors are allowed to borrow only a limited amount, as the loan amount increases so 
does the interest rate, to keep the borrowing limit unchanged. Therefore, it is the borrowing 
constraint that determines investment demand, which falls with the interest rate. 
 
The higher interest rate is, in this framework, favourable to the poor lender and less beneficial 
to the rich. At a higher interest rate the poor accumulate more wealth, while the rich‟s 
accumulation is slower. The high interest rate also increases the credit rationing threshold. 
Consequently, while the high interest rate is good for the poor, it is not so for the middle-
class, which could borrow and become entrepreneurs at a lower interest rate. 
 
Wealth trickles down to the poor, allowing them to escape poverty, as the rich accumulate 
more wealth and push the interest rate up. Hence, the rich accumulate wealth because of the 
poor. A large pool of poor lenders is able to meet the large demands for credit of the few rich, 
the latter facing a higher return in their projects than the borrowing rate. So, the poor are 
never able to accumulate enough wealth to become entrepreneurs as the rich do not 
accumulate enough wealth to pool the poor out of poverty. In this case, the long-run steady 
state will be one with endogenous inequality. 
 
An alternative scenario would occur when the interest rate is high enough that the rich 
actually manage to accumulate enough wealth to allow the poor to escape poverty and the 
economy ends up in a steady state with lower inequality 
 
The predictions of Aghion and Bolton (1997) would not be applicable in this case since their 











their initial wealth endowment, but also on the interest rate and as the interest rate falls there 
is a greater preference for borrowing. Although credit is rationed at this low interest rate, 
those able to invest will face an increasingly higher private return, especially those borrowing 
large amounts. Eventually, as the investment opportunities become scarcer, a larger pool of 
borrowers will be able to benefit from the lower interest rate. A lower interest rate will be 
associated with a lower level of inequality in this model, contrary to the evidence and the 
predictions of Matsuyama (2000). 
 
Piketty (1997) on the other hand, explains that if we assume that the poor are net lenders, 
then a higher interest rate would imply that the interest rate effect dominates the credit-
rationing effect, allowing the poor to accumulate wealth and escape poverty and the middle-
class to become entrepreneurs. 
 
The models proposed by Matsuyama (2000) and Piketty (1997) (assuming the poor as net 
lenders) would be applicable to the South African evidence for Apartheid era; whereby 
declining interest rates would benefit the rich, allowing them to increase their investments 
(especially given the high capital requirements of mining and manufacturing at the time), and 
their private returns. The lower interest rates would not favour lenders, i.e. the poor. As the 
wealth of those at the top increased, we would expect the poor not to benefit as much, 
increasing the income gap. 
 
The 1950s were a period of significant growth as the economy diversified into commerce and 
industry. It is reasonable to expect that the English capitalists had enough opportunities 
available to them so that they would indeed borrow to invest. Evidence can be found that the 
apartheid government‟s increased credit extensions to the Afrikaner landowners gave way to 
the creation of a new Afrikaner elite more engaged in the financial market than before (Bond, 
2003). As per Matsuyama (2000) a larger pool of “rich” borrowers implies higher interest 
rates, which then benefit the poor as lenders reducing inequality. The new Afrikaner 
government also worked to institutionalise existing racial practices. So, while the income gap 
between the English and the Afrikaner population declined, the black South Africans lagged 
behind. The financial development literature borrowing the political economy arguments, 
makes the valid proposition that although financial development helps reduce inequality it 
can have a disproportionately negative impact on the poor if it different political structures 











population (Clarke, Xu and Zou, 2003). Given the fact that we are using the top income 
shares as our definition of inequality, we might not be able to capture accurately certain 
changes at the bottom, meaning that although the middle-class benefited and concentration of 
income at the top declined, the data could be masking changes in income among the poor. 
 
The financial sector suffered major alterations after the 1950s as banks began to innovate and 
diversify their activities and the sector in general took advantage of technological innovation. 
Increased financial activity and intermediation allowed the Afrikaner middle-class investors 
to accumulate more capital and catch up with the wealthy English capitalists. 
 
In the 1960s the withdrawal of South Africa from the Common-wealth, the political unrest 
and high inflation had dire consequences on the country‟s economy. The changes to banking 
legislation and the imposition of capital controls added to investors‟ uncertainty, creating 
incentives for capital flight. Mergers and acquisitions on one side and capital flight on the 
other further reduced competition and efficiency in the financial sector. As pointed out by the 
financial development literature, the negative developments in financial markets affect its 
ability to channel savings to investors, exacerbating credit constraints on the poor, thereby 
increasing the income gap. History describes the 1960s as being a period of declines in 
investment, accompanied by a declining (and volatile) interest rate and increasing inequality. 
 
Financial markets began to recover in the 1980s, after the implementation of some of the 
recommendations of the De Cock Commission of enquiry into the monetary system and 
monetary policy. The removal of barriers on capital markets and the adoption of a clearly 
defined monetary policy stance worked to increase capital flows, reduce inflation and 
incentivise competition and diversification of banking operations which then put pressure on 
interest rates. Top income inequality continued to decrease and a hypothesis could be made 
that it was either due to the positive effects it had on lenders – the poor, as specified by 
Matsuyama (2000) – or a reflection of losses suffered by investors during that period. The 
financial development literature also provides us with evidence that increased competition in 
















Figure 6: Inequality and interest rate, 1994-2008. Source: World Bank Development Indicators (2010) 
Firer and McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002). 
 
5.3 Inequality and interest rates, 1994-2008 
 
The upward trends in both interest rates and inequality after 1994 can be contextualised in 
terms of the framework developed by Piketty (1997) in which the scarcity of rich individuals 
in an economy implies that there is an excess demand for credit. The upward pressure of 
interest rates limits borrowing and investing for the poor and widens the income gap. Thus, in 
a society such as South Africa where wealth is concentrated among a small minority, we 
would expect such scarcity to be associated with high interest rates and high inequality as 
shown by the positive within period correlation in Table 1. 
 
Figure 6 above, displays a picture of South Africa as a very unequal economy with the 
highest 10 percent of wealth holders holding more than 50 percent of the country‟s income. 
This is a somewhat unexpected finding, given that government‟s policy post-apartheid took a 
clear stance to reduce poverty and income inequality. Empirical evidence shows that despite 
these efforts the development trajectory of the country has not been pro-poor, with the faster-
growing sectors of the sector demanding skilled labour, and capital markets remaining highly 
concentrated, demanding of skills and collateral assets that the poor lack.  
 
In theory, the greater focus of monetary policy in stabilising interest rates and inflation, the 
























































































Market, the liberalisation of these markets, and the restructuring and globalisation of 
domestic banking operation should have resulted in a decline in inequality as investment 
opportunities became more diversified and competition among lenders drove down interest 
rates. However, once Dr. M. H. De Kock became governor of the Reserve Bank in 1989, his 
commitment to monetary stability translated into rather higher interest rates, which remained 
high for the majority of the period ending in 2008. Small business owners have identified 
these high interest rates as a relevant restriction to entrepreneurship. 
 
The financial sector remains very concentrated and with substantial entry barriers. . The fixed 
costs associated with joining financial intermediaries have been identified as a deterrent to 
investment. These costs imply that the wealthy are more likely to access financial markets 
and will therefore accumulate more capital (or at least at a faster rate) than the poor, 
increasing the income gap. As postulated Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2009) although a well-
developed financial system in theory should reduce income gap between the rich and the 
poor, by increasing the availability of financial services, it can also happen that financial 
development exacerbates the gap by increasing availability of such services to those who 
already have access to financial intermediaries, usually the wealthy. Therefore, the benefits of 
improvements in the financial system could fall disproportionately on the rich, widening the 
inequality gap and propagating the differences in economic opportunity across income 
groups. 
 
More recent studies have shown that many of the country‟s poor have remained unbanked, 
despite extensive institutional measures implemented to remedy this outcome. Both the cost 
and the concentration of financial institutions in urban areas have been identified as the 
causes of such exclusion (Pellicer et al., 2011). Furthermore, a large proportion of South 
Africa‟s poor population lack documented credit histories; this makes their insertion into the 
formal economy even harder. The lack of experience and adequate managerial skills to ensure 
the viability of the enterprise are also an obstacle (Bamu, Schuckman and Godfrey, 2007).  
 
On the supply side, the high costs of servicing loans to small businesses relative to the size of 
the loan imply that lenders are less likely to extend credit to such businesses. In general, there 
is a fixed administrative cost associated with servicing loans, regardless of their size. Thus, 











smaller loans less profitable. This creates a gap in credit provision for smaller loans (Bamu, 
Schuckman and Godfrey, 2007). 
 
Given all the above-mentioned factors, it comes as no surprise that, as hypothesised by 
Piketty (1997), the high fixed costs associated with profitable investment opportunities and 
high interest rates have been accompanied by high inequality. Imperfect information has kept 
lenders away from the poorer borrowers, trusting only the rich. The poor are thus credit-
rationed. Also, the rich constitute a small minority in the country, their being the net lenders, 
pushes up the interest rate and constricts capital accumulation, hurting the trickle-down 
process to the poor, who never accumulate enough capital to escape poverty. The data 
provides no evidence of a unique steady state with incomes converging as specified by 
Aghion and Bolton (1997). 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 
Economic theory based on the relationship between financial markets and inequality in the 
presence of imperfect information provides ambiguous predictions as to the impact of interest 
rates and inequality. If markets are complete, then investment will be determined by the 
expected return and the cost of capital.  People with the same returns on their investment will 
be able to invest the same amount irrespective of their initial wealth. However, imperfections 
in the credit market mean that lenders cannot observe borrowers‟ efforts and availability of 
collateral assets will be a significant determinant of lending decisions. The rich have the 
option of financing their own investments, while the poor or middle-class agents will need to 
borrow to complement their own investment. However, because the poor lack collateral 
assets their borrowing will be limited. 
 
Two possible situations may arise as a result of imperfect information in credit markets: one 
in which the poor are net borrowers and higher interest rates prevent them from accumulating 
enough wealth to escape the credit-rationing interval as specified by Piketty (1997). In this 
case, inequality may persist even in the long-run. Aghion and Bolton (1997) show the 
mechanism through which wealth can trickle down to the poor. Capital accumulation by the 
rich makes more funds available in the economy, driving down the interest rate, allowing the 











which case, increasing demand for investment by the rich pushes up the interest rate thus 
benefiting the poor as lenders as postulated by Matsuyama (2000). 
We analyse these two possible outcomes in the context of the South African economy over 
three distinct periods: colonialism, apartheid and democracy. The conclusions are drawn 
based on the correlations between interest rates and inequality. For the colonial and apartheid 
years (1923-1993) we use a measure inequality recently published by Alvaredo and Atkinson 
(2010) calculated as the income shares of the top 1 percent wealth holders, estimated using 
income tax data. Given the data limitations, for the years following the implementation of the 
democratic regime (1994-2008), we use the World Bank Development Indicators to 
determine the top 10 percent income shares. The interest rate data is obtained from Firer and 
McLeod (1999) and Firer and Staunton (2002) updated to 2008. The evidence shows that 
credit markets were not the sole determinants of inequality for any of the periods; however, 
they did play a role in widening or reducing inequality, depending on the epoch analysed. 
 
During the colonial period, the economy was heavily reliant on gold and diamond mining, 
London Banks had control over the financial market and the owners of capital were mostly 
the English elite. We find, for this period, a positive relationship between interest rates and 
inequality. We attempt to understand the trend in the context of Aghion and Bolton (1997) 
and Piketty (1997) and conclude that high interest rates could have worked as a deterrent to 
investment. However, the accumulation of wealth by the rich did to some extent trickle down 
to the middle-class insofar as it gave way to the diversification of economic activity into 
other less capital intensive activities such as manufacturing and commercial agriculture. 
 
For the duration of the apartheid regime, the data shows a negative association between 
interest rates and inequality. While, mining continued to dominate the country‟s national 
accounts, the financial market gained an increased role as did government spending. We 
analyse the evidence in accordance to the framework provided by Matsuyama (2000), 
whereby increasing returns to investment implies that the poor are net lenders, higher interest 
rates thus benefit the poor and not the rich. The historical analysis shows that after 1948, 
accumulation of wealth by the English elites implied increased demand for funds pushing 
interest rates up and benefiting those at the bottom. As the financial market developed, the 
Afrikaner landowners were able to participate more in the economy. However, one cannot 
ignore the fact that government policy at the time played a significant role in reducing the 











Following the implementation of the multi-racial democracy in 1994, the relationship 
reverted back to the colonial period estimates whereby higher interest rates were associated 
with higher inequality. Many economists have been puzzled by this result to the extent that 
the substantial changes to monetary policy and the institutional environment, the 
technological advances experienced in the financial markets and the ending of the racial 
divide were all expected to contribute to the reduction of inequality. In such an environment 
and in particular with more efficient financial markets, higher interest rates should have an 
effect in lowering inequality as capital accumulation by the rich and growth trickled-down to 
the poor; however this has not been the case. In trying to understand this outcome, one needs 
to account for the fact that many of the country‟s poor remain unbanked and live in rural 
areas while financial markets are concentrated in urban areas. Moreover, capital income is 
highly concentrated at the top, meaning that the rich are the most likely to benefit from any 
improvements to financial intermediation. 
 
Although this is analysis reveals interesting trends it is not without limitations. Firstly, the 
theoretical models employed are not able to capture the full complexity of the South African 
economy. Secondly, given the data limitations, one can only attempt to understand these 
trends; more in depth analysis would require more detailed data, especially for the colonial 
and apartheid periods. Also, our measure of income inequality, although it captures the 
changes in inequality at the top, it does not necessarily capture the changes at the bottom. 
Lastly, there is very little research examining the particular mechanism through which 
financial development impacts inequality, part of the problem again being data availability 
and this paper provides only a theoretical overview of the role of interest rates. 
 
Our results point to the important role credit markets and financial intermediation could have 
in reducing income inequality. Given the size of the second economy and the contribution it 
has in absorbing the unskilled and unemployed labour in the country, credit constraints on the 
poor could well translate into constraints to small business development in the formal 
economy. In this regard, government policies that give incentives to the private sector to 
evaluate and provide credit to small business owners, policies that augment entrepreneurial 
activity by increasing secondary as well as high school enrolment, especially among the black 
population, could in the long run contribute to the reduction of inequality. The role of policy 
also extends to the development and implementation of measures to boost private sector 











Moreover, the Reserve Bank‟s focus on inflation targeting has translated into what some 
economists, entrepreneurs and labour organisations identify as a high interest rate, which 
deters small business development in the country. Establishing a balance between the goal of 
containing inflationary expectation on one hand and ensuring an interest rate that does not 
hurt borrowers on the other is an ongoing challenge for monetary authorities. However, 
further research has to be done that will clarify the exact path for government policy in terms 
of counteracting the impacts of high interest rates on small scale investors and  ensuring pro-
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